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Secure and Robust Identification via
Classical-Quantum Channels
Holger Boche Fellow, IEEE, Christian Deppe Member, IEEE, and Andreas Winter
Abstract—We study the identification capacity of
classical-quantum channels (“cq-channels”) under chan-
nel uncertainty and privacy constraints. To be precise,
we first consider compound memoryless cq-channels and
determine their identification capacity; then we add an
eavesdropper by considering compound memoryless wire-
tap cqq-channels, and determine their secret identification
capacity. In the first case (without privacy), we find the
identification capacity always equal to the transmission
capacity. In the second case, we find a dichotomy: either
the secrecy capacity (also known as private capacity) of
the channel is zero, and then the secrecy identification
capacity is also zero, or the secrecy capacity is positive
and then the secrecy identification capacity equals the
transmission capacity of the main channel without the
wiretapper. We perform the same analysis for the case
of arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels (cqq-AVWC)
with analogous findings, and make several observations
regarding the continuity and super-additivity of the iden-
tification capacity in the latter case.
I. INTRODUCTION
Identification via channels was introduced by
Ahlswede and Dueck [4] forty years after Shannon
[37] introduced information theory as a theory of
communication. In Shannon’s transmission theory, the
sender encodes the messages as sequences of channel
input letters in such a way, that although the channel
might not transmit the sequence correctly, the receiver
still can decide what message had been sent, at least
with a high probability.
In the theory of identification, the receiver is not
interested in the exact message, but only wants to know
if the sent message is equal to a particular one that
he is interested in. Of course, the sender does not
know in which message the receiver is interesting. It
was shown that there are codes for classical channels
with double exponential size in the block length of
the codewords. In identification theory, one considers
also models in which several receivers receive the
same transmission but are interested in different one
messages. Applications for identification codes can be
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found in the theory of digital watermarks [3], [31] and
communication complexity [38].
Investigation into communication via quantum chan-
nels started in the 1960s. We refer the reader to the
book [41] for more details on quantum and classical
channels and the various transmission capacities asso-
ciated with them, including their history.
Lo¨ber [30] was the first to consider identification via
classical-quantum channels (so-called cq-channels). He
introduced two generalizations of the classical identi-
fication codes. First he defined identification codes for
cq-channels where the receiver has a binary measure-
ment for each possible message he could be interested
in. Crucially, in quantum mechanics, these measure-
ments may be incompatible, meaning that one cannot
identify several messages at the same time. In certain
applications, this is an undesirable feature, when there
are many receivers each wanting to identify “their”
message. To address this, Lo¨ber formulated a second
model, that of a simultaneous ID-code, for which there
has to be one single (simultaneous) measurement that
allows us to identify every message at the same time.
This model is also valid if the one who performs
the measurement is not the ultimate receiver, and
in particular, does not know in which message this
receiver is interested. There are many examples where
identification schemes require simultaneous ID-codes
because their real implementation would consist of
many receivers at a time (for examples see [4]). This
is not always the case [28] if both sender and receiver
have a (possibly different) text and they want to check
if it is the same one, using an ID-code. Here, only one
receiver is asking only one question.
In the present paper, we consider both secure and
robust models of cq-channels. Our coding schemes
are all simultaneous, but we will prove converses in
the general, non-simultaneous setting. With this, we
characterize the identification and the simultaneous
identification capacity. Here, these two capacities turn
out to be the same.
Security is modeled by a channel with an eavesdrop-
per, called a wiretap cqq-channel. It is connecting a
sender with two receivers, a legal one and a wiretapper.
The legitimate receiver accesses the output of the first
channel and the wiretapper observes the output of the
second channel. A code for the channel conveys infor-
mation to the legal receiver such that the wiretapper
knows nothing about the transmitted information. The
2classical degraded form of this channel was introduced
by Wyner [45], who determined the secrecy capacity
of this channel. The classical non-degraded model was
presented and solved in [20]. The wiretap cqq-channel
was considered in [19] and in [21].
To model the robustness aspect, we consider com-
pound cq-channels, which are described as a set of
memoryless channels. Before the start of the trans-
mission, a channel is chosen unknown to the sender
or receiver, and used during the transmission of one
codeword. The code of the sender and the receiver has
to be robust and therefore independent of the chosen
model. The classical channel model was introduced by
Blackwell, Breiman, and Thomasian [10]. The com-
pound cq-channel was considered in [8], [32] and [18].
There exist many combinations of these concepts.
The classical compound wiretap channel was con-
sidered in [29] and [9]. The transmission capacity
of the compound wiretap cqq-channel was given in
[11]. For an overview we refer to the wide ranging
textbook by Wilde [41], which only omits the theory
of identification over quantum channels. An overview
on this topic can be found in [43]. In [16] we gave
the identification capacities for the classical compound
channel and the classical compound wiretap channel.
Therefore, the present paper is a generalization to the
classical-quantum case.
The structure of our paper is as follows. We start
in Section II with the basic definitions of cq-channels
and of transmission and identification via cq-channels;
we review the main result of [30] and [6] where the
identification capacity of cq-channels were given. We
generalize this result in Section III for identification
via compound cq-channels. In Section IV, we define
how to add the wiretapper to the model, define wiretap
cqq-channels and give their capacity, and we prove
a dichotomy theorem for its secure identification ca-
pacity. We generalize this result in Section V for the
secure identification capacity of a compound wiretap
cqq-channel, i.e. we prove a capacity theorem for
secure and robust identification via quantum channels.
In Section VI we assume that the channel state can
change after each qubit transmitted by the sender.
We assume that this action comes from a jammer
and consider the worst case. In Section VII we also
add a wiretapper to this model. We give the capacity
for both models. Finally, in Section VIII we analyze
the calculated capacities as functions of the channel
parameter.
II. BASIC DEFINITIONS AND RESULTS
In this section we give recall the definitions of cq-
channels, and of transmission and identification via cq-
channels. Furthermore, we review the main results of
[30] and [6].
Cq-channels have a classical sender, having access to
an input alphabet X , but their output is quantum, being
described by a Hilbert space B. As is customary, we
identify the states on B, S(B) with the set of density
operators, i.e. the self-adjoint, positive semidefinite,
linear operators on B with unit trace:
S(B) = {ρ : ρ = ρ∗ ≥ 0,Tr ρ = 1},
where Tr ρ =
∑
i 〈i|ρ|i〉 for some complete orthonor-
mal basis {|i〉}i.
Definition 2.1: A discrete classical-quantum channel
(cq-channel) is a map W : X −→ S(B) where X
is a finite set and S(B) the set of quantum states of
the complex Hilbert space B, which we assume to be
finite dimensional. Furthermore, we denote a = |X |
the cardinality of X , and d = |B| the dimension of B.
Associated to W is the channel map on a sequence
of length n over the alphabet X .
W⊗n : Xn −→ S(B⊗n)
with W (xn) = W⊗n(xn) = W (x1) ⊗ · · · ⊗W (xn).
(Note that to abbreviate, we will customarily omit the
superscript ⊗n if the block length is evident from the
input string xn.) We call W⊗n a memoryless channel.
In the following, we use the notation W⊗n(P ) ,∑
xn∈An P (x
n)W (xn) to denote the output state of
the channel in S(B⊗n) when the input is distributed
according to P . To access the (classical) information
of a quantum state, we have to perform a measurement
on the output space.
Definition 2.2: Let B be a finite dimensional Hilbert
space. A POVM (positive operator valued measure)
on B is a collection (Di)Ni=1 of positive semidefinite
operators Di on B such that
∑N
i=1Di = 1B , where
1B denotes the identity operator on B.
In transmission theory, Alice uses the classical-
quantum channel to transmit messages from the set X
to Bob. He tries to determine the transmitted messages
by making a quantum measurement (POVM).
Definition 2.3: An (n,M, λ)-code is a set of pairs
{(Pi, Di) : i ∈ [M ] , {1, . . . ,M}} where the Pi are
probability distributions on Xn and D , (Di)i∈[M ] a
POVM on B⊗n such that: TrW⊗n(Pi)·Di ≥ 1−λ. The
largest M such that an (n, λ)-code exists is denoted
M(n, λ).
The rate R of a (n,M, λ)-code is defined as R =
1
n
logM . A rate R is said to be achievable if for
all η ∈ (0, 1) there exists a n0(η), such that for all
n ≥ n0(η) there exists an (n, 2n(R−η), η)-code. The
transmission capacity C(W) of a compound cq-channel
W is the supremum of all achievable rates, which
hence, is the largest achievable rate. One of the main
topics in quantum information theory is to determine
the transmission capacities of channels.
Let ρ ∈ S(A) be a state of a quantum
system A. We denote by S(ρA) = S(A) =
−Tr ρA log ρA the von Neumann entropy. Furthermore,
we define the Holevo information I(X : B) =
I(P ;W ) = S(W (P ))−S(W |P ) with the output state
3W (P ) =
∑
x∈X P (x)W (x) ∈ S(B), and S(W |P ) =∑
x∈X P (x)S(W (x)), the conditional entropy of the
channel output for the input distribution P .
Theorem 2.4 ([26], [35]): The classical transmission
capacity of the cq-channel W , defined as
C(W ) = inf
λ>0
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logM(n, λ),
is given by
C(W ) = max
P (x)
I(P ;W ).
Furthermore, the strong converse holds [34], [42]:
lim
n→∞
1
n
logM(n, λ) = C(W ). 
In [41], more properties and results about transmit-
ting classical information over quantum channels are
discussed.
A. Identification via cq-channels
Compared to transmission, in identification theory
we change the goal for Bob: We assume that he “only”
wants to know if the transmitted message is equal to
some j.
Definition 2.5: An (n,N, λ1, λ2) ID-code is a set of
pairs {(Pi, Di) : i ∈ [N ]} where the Pi are probability
distributions on Xn and the Di are POVM elements,
i.e. 0 ≤ Di ≤ 1, acting on B⊗n, that ∀ i 6= j ∈ [N ]
TrW⊗n(Pi)·Di ≥ 1− λ1 and
TrW⊗n(Pi)·Dj ≤ λ2.
The largest size N of an (n,N, λ1, λ2) ID-code is
denoted N(n, λ1, λ2).
We use a stochastic encoder for the encoding of
the messages; this is essential in the theory of iden-
tification. The definition of an ID-code only partially
fits the definition of a classical identification code in
the following sense. There are applications of classical
identification codes, where one assumes that there are
several receivers, each only interested in one message,
and all wanting to decide individually if “their” mes-
sage was sent. The example given in [4] is that of
N sailors on a ship, and each sailor is related to one
relative. On a stormy night, one sailor drowns in the
ocean. One could now broadcast the name of the sailor
to all relatives. However, this takes ⌈log2N⌉ bits. And
the news is of interest only to one relative. If we now
allow a certain error probability, we can broadcast an
identification code using only O(log2 log2N) bits.
The ID-code for a quantum channel has the property
that the received state cannot be used in general to
ask for two different messages. The reason is that the
POVMs (Di,1 − Di) are in general not compatible.
Therefore the realisation of applications with more than
one receiver, like in the example above, is not possible
with an ID-code as defined. There are, however, appli-
cations where we have only two parties, who want to
check if they have the same text (such as watermarking,
or in the communication complexity setting). Lo¨ber
[30] defined simultaneous ID-codes to overcome this
limitation. In this code model, there has to be one
single measurement which allows us to identify every
message at the same time.
Definition 2.6: An ID-code {(Pi, Di) : i ∈ [N ]}
is called simultaneous if there is a POVM (Ey)y∈Y
acting on B⊗n and subsets Ai ⊆ Y , such that Di =∑
y∈Ai Ey for all i ∈ [N ]. The largest size of a simulta-
neous (n, λ1, λ2) ID-code is denoted Nsim(n, λ1, λ2).
In this case the measurement gives as a result some
y ∈ Y , and receiver i has to check whether y ∈ Ai.
Note that the definition can be expressed equivalently
by requiring that the measurements (D1,1 − Di) are
all compatible, because this requires that there exists a
common refinement of them, i.e. a POVM of which all
(D1,1−Di) are coarse grainings.
Remark 2.7: If the Di are not compatible, there is
no way of measuring them all together jointly, but this
does not mean that we have to give up. To identify a
set of messages i1, . . . , ik, we could simply apply the
decoding POVMs (Diκ ,1−Diκ) sequentially in some
order. That this is not a bad idea follows from the gentle
measurement lemma [42]: since each measurement has
a high probability of giving the correct outcome, the
state is disturbed, but only “a little” in trace norm, so
we can subject the next measurement as if nothing had
happened at all.
The best analysis of this approach is using Sen’s
non-commutative union bound [36] in the version of
Wilde for general POVMs [40]. Using this bound,
we can see that if we have any ID-code with errors
λ1, λ2 ≤ λ, then we can correctly identify any set of
k ≤ ε24λ messages, with error probability bounded by ε.
This will not include all messages, since for the rates
below the capacity, the error λ can be made to vanish
exponentially we get at least an exponentially large k.
In the present paper we consider the identification
capacity of a cq-channel, of which we distinguish
a priori simultaneous and non-simultaenous flavours,
following Lo¨ber [30]:
Definition 2.8: The (simultaneous) classical ID-
capacity of a cq-channel W is defined as
CID(W ) , inf
λ>0
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log logN(n, λ, λ),
CsimID (W ) , inf
λ>0
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log logNsim(n, λ, λ),
respectively.
Lo¨ber [30] showed that for cq-channels, the simul-
taneous classical ID capacity is equal to the trans-
mission capacity. Furthermore, he showed that the
strong converse holds for simultaneous ID-codes. Later,
Ahlswede and Winter [6] extended the strong converse
to non-simultaneous ID-codes.
Theorem 2.9 ([30], [6]): For any cq-channel W ,
CsimID (W ) = CID(W ) = C(W ),
4and the strong converse holds: for all λ1 + λ2 < 1,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log logN(n, λ1, λ2)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
log logNsim(n, λ1, λ2) = C(W ). 
Ahlswede and Winter also considered the case of
a general (quantum-quantum) channel, but the results
are much less complete. It is not even clear if in the
general case the simultaneous capacity and the non-
simultaneous ID-capacity coincide. See the subsequent
papers [24] and the review [43] for a presentation of
the state of the art.
Definitions 2.5 and 2.6 address Freeman Dyson’s
critique on the status quo of experiments, measure-
ments, and detectors in particle physics (of course in
our setting of operational tasks). According to Dyson,
experiments as currently conducted in particle physics,
can only answer very specific questions. Analogous
to our model, this corresponds to identification codes
(Definition 2.5), and in particular the use of message-
dependent measurements. In comparison, the simulta-
neous identification codes provide universal measure-
ments so that the relevant questions can be answered
by classical post-processing.
We will also show that the same performance can be
achieved with this code concept as with fully general
identification codes. Of course, particle physics appli-
cations do not have the luxury of being able to control
the encoding in general.
III. IDENTIFICATION VIA ROBUST CQ-CHANNELS
In this section we will define the identification
capacity of a compound cq-channel and derive its
single-letter formula. In [32] and [18], the transmission
capacity was derived. We will use the transmission
code and build an identification code with the method
introduced in [5]. This method was also used in [30]
to get the identification capacity of a cq-channel. For
the converse we generalize the method of [6].
Definition 3.1: Let Θ be an index set, X a finite
set and B a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. Let Wt :
X −→ S(B) be a cq-channel for every t ∈ Θ:
Wt : X ∋ x 7→Wt(x) ∈ S(B).
The memoryless extension of the cq-channel Wt is
given by Wt(x
n) = W⊗nt (xn) = Wt(x1) ⊗ . . . ⊗
Wt(xn) for x
n ∈ Xn. We then call W , {Wt}t∈Θ
a compound cq-channel.
Definition 3.2: An (n,M, λ)-code for the compound
cq-channel W is a family C , ((Pm, Dm) : m ∈ [M ])
consisting of pairs of stochastic encodings given by
code word probability distributions Pm over Xn and
positive semi-definite operators Di ∈ B(B⊗n) forming
a POVM, i.e.
∑M
m=1Dm = 1Bn , such that
sup
t∈Θ
max
i∈[M ]
1− TrW⊗nt (Pi)Di ≤ λ.
The number M is called the size of the code, and
λ the error probability. The maximum M for given n
and λ is denoted M(n, λ), extending the definition for
a cq-channel (which is recovered for |Θ| = 1).
The capacity of W is defined as before,
C(W) = inf
λ>0
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logM(n, λ).
Thus an (n,M, λ)-code for the compound cq-
channel W ensures that the maximal error probability
for all channels Wt is uniformly bounded above by
λ. A more intuitive description of the compound cq-
channel is that the sender and receiver do not know
which channel from the set W is actually used during
the transmission of the n-block; their prior knowledge
is merely that the channel is memoryless and belongs
to the setW . Their task is to prepare for the worst case
among those.
Theorem 3.3 ([8]): Let W be a compound
cq-channel with finite input alphabet X and
finite-dimensional output Hilbert space B. Then,
C(W) = max
P (x)
inf
t∈Θ
I(P ;Wt). 
We stress that we explicitly allow stochastic en-
coders in the definition. It is known that this does
not change the capacity compared to deterministic
encoders, although it makes it easier for us to relate
later channel models to compound cq-channel coding
results. Note however, that this change implies that the
average error probability criterion and the maximum
error criterion lead to the same achievable rates, and
so the strong converse does not hold any more, only
the weak converse.
Definition 3.4: An (n,N, λ1, λ2) ID-code for the
compound cq-channel W is a set of pairs {(Pi, Di) :
i ∈ [N ]}, where the Pi are probability distributions on
Xn and the Di are POVM elements, i.e. 0 ≤ Di ≤ 1
acting on B⊗n, such that ∀ i 6= j ∈ [N ]
inf
t∈Θ
TrW⊗nt (Pi)·Di ≥ 1− λ1 and
sup
t∈Θ
TrW⊗nt (Pi)·Dj ≤ λ2.
The largest size of an (n,N, λ1, λ2) ID-code is denoted
N(n, λ1, λ2). Analogous to previous definitions, we
also have simultaneous ID-codes and the maximum
code size Nsim(n, λ1, λ2).
The identification capacities are defined as before.
All capacities in this paper are defined in the so-called
pessimistic way. The optimistic definition of capacity is
C¯(W) = infλ>0 lim supn→∞ 1n logM(n, λ). We show
that the converse holds for the optimistic definition and
therefore also for the pessimistic definition.
Theorem 3.5: Let W be an arbitrary compound
cq-channel with finite input alphabet X and finite-
dimensional output Hilbert space B. Then,
CID(W) = CsimID (W) = C(W) = inf
t∈Θ
I(Q;Wt),
5and the weak converse holds for the optimistic ID-
capacity. Indeed,
inf
λ1,λ2>0
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
logN(n, λ1, λ2)
= inf
λ1,λ2>0
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logNsim(n, λ1, λ2)
= C(W).
Proof.We will use an (n,M, λ)-code for the compound
channel to construct an (n,N, λ1, λ2) ID-code. We use
the following lemma from [30], which is a slightly
modified version of the original in [4]:
Lemma 3.6 ([30]): Let M be a finite set of car-
dinality M and let λ ∈ (0, 1). Let ε > 0 be small
enough so that λ log2(
1
ε
− 1) > 2. Then there are at
least N ≥ 1
M
2⌊εM⌋ subsets A1, . . . ,AN ⊂ M, each
of cardinality ⌊εM⌋, such that the cardinalities of the
pairwise intersections satisfy, for all i 6= j ∈ [N ],
|Ai∩Aj | < λ⌊εM⌋. 
By definition of the transmission capacity, there is
an (n,M, λ)-code C = {(cm, Em) : m ∈ [M ]} with
M ≥ 2(C(W)−δ)n if n is large enough. Using [M ]
as ground set, Lemma 3.6 provides us with subsets
A1, . . . ,AN ⊂ [M ] of cardinality ⌊εM⌋ with pairwise
intersections smaller than λ⌊εM⌋. Here we have for
the number N of those sets:
N ≥ 1
M
2⌊εM⌋ ≥
n≫1
2 ⌊ε2
(C(W)−δ)n⌋−n.
We construct a simultaneous ID-code {(Pi, Di) : i =
1, . . . , N} by taking as Pi the uniform distribution on
sets Ci , {cm : m ∈ Ai}, and as Di the sum of the
corresponding Em’s:
Pi(x
n) ,
{
1
⌊εM⌋ if x
n ∈ Ci,
0 otherwise,
and Di ,
∑
m∈Ai
Em (i = 1, . . . , N).
We choose λ1 ≥ λ and λ2 ≥ 2λ. It is now straightfor-
ward to bound the errors:
min
t∈Θ
TrW⊗nt (Pi)·Dj
=
1
⌊εM⌋ mint∈Θ
∑
m∈Ai
∑
m′∈Ai
TrWnt,cm′Em
≥ 1⌊εM⌋ mint∈Θ
∑
m∈Ai
TrWnt (cm)Em
≥ 1− λ ≥ 1− λ1.
For i 6= j,
max
t∈Θ
TrWnt (Pi)·Dj
=
1
⌊εM⌋ maxt∈Θ
∑
m∈Aj
∑
m′∈Ai
TrWnt,cm′Em
=
1
⌊εM⌋ maxt∈Θ
∑
m∈Aj
 ∑
m′∈Ai∩Aj
TrWnt,cm′Em
+
∑
m′∈Ai\Aj
TrWnt,cm′Em

≤ 1⌊εM⌋

∑
m′∈Ai∩Aj
max
t∈Θ
TrWnt,cm′
 ∑
m∈Aj
Em

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ 1
+
∑
m′∈Ai\Aj
max
t∈Θ
TrWnt,cm′
 ∑
m∈Aj
Em

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤λ

≤ 1⌊εM⌋λ⌊εM⌋+
1
⌊εM⌋⌊εM⌋λ = 2λ ≤ λ2,
where we have used |Ai ∩ Aj | < λ⌊εM⌋. Therefore
we have shown
CID(W) ≥ CsimID (W) ≥ C(W).
It remains to prove the converse, i.e.
CsimID (W) ≤ CID(W) ≤ C(W).
For this, consider an arbitrary (non-simultaneous)
(n, λ1, λ2)-ID code {(Pi, Di) : i ∈ [N ]}.
1. The first step follows by applying the theory
of types. Fix a δ-net T ⊂ P(X ) on the probability
distributions on X , i.e. for any p.d. P there exists a
Q ∈ T with 12‖P −Q‖1 ≤ δ. It is known that such a
net can be chosen with |T | ≤ ( c
δ
)|X |
for a constant
c > 0. This induces a partition of the input space
Xn = ⋃Q∈T AQ in such a way that the type (i.e. the
empirical distribution) of each xn ∈ AQ is δ-close to
Q. Now we can write each distribution Pi as
Pi =
⊕
Q∈T
µi(Q)PiQ,
where µi is a p.d. over T and the PiQ are p.d.’s over
AQ (extended trivially to all of Xn). Choose an ε-net
M ⊂ P(T ) which can be found with |M| ≤ ( c
ε
)|T |
.
Then there exists a µ ∈M such that at least a fraction
of 1|M| of the messages has its µi ε-close to µ: w.l.o.g.,
∀i ∈ [N ′] =
⌊
N
|M|
⌋
1
2
‖µi − µ‖1 ≤ ε.
6Now modify the code as follows:
P ′i ,
⊕
Q∈T
µ(Q)PiQ,
for i ∈ [N ′], leaving the Di unchanged. This clearly
gives an (n,N ′, λ′1, λ
′
2)-ID code with λ
′
1 = λ1 + ε,
λ′2 = λ2 + ε. If λ1 + λ2 < 1, we can choose ε small
enough to ensure that λ′1 + λ
′
2 < 1.
2. Now, there exists a Q ∈ T with µ(Q) ≥ 1|T | .
Modify the code once more by truncating all other
contributions Q′ ∈ T , i.e. consider the code {(P ′′i ,
PiQ, Di) : i ∈ [N ′]}. Since the encodings are a
small, but not too-small fraction of the P ′i , the error
probabilities can increase significantly, but we can
control them. Concretely, the new code has errors of
the first and second kind, λ′′1 = |T |λ′1 and λ′′2 = |T |λ′2,
respectively. Since we are in the weak converse regime
of λ1 + λ2 → 0 asymptotically, we can choose ε→ 0
sufficiently slowly so that λ′1 +λ
′
2 → 0 too, and hence
for each δ > 0, λ′′1+λ
′′
2 → 0. As we selected a fraction
of the messages that is going to zero arbitrarily slowly,
we have the same asymptotic rate.
3. At this point we are in a good position: all the
code distributions P ′′i = PiQ are supported on AQ,
which is a subset of the δ-typical sequences (in the
sense of frequency typicality). Which means we can
apply the converse proof from [6] to each Wt ∈ W ,
t ∈ Θ, obtaining
1
n
log logN ′ ≤ I(Q;Wt) +O
(
δ log |B|+ h2(δ)
)
,
the latter terms occurring because the types of se-
quences in AQ fluctuate up to δ around Q. This
completes it, since we can choose δ > 0 arbitrarily
small, and as explained above, ε can be made to go to
0 arbitrarily slowly. Hence,
1
n
log logN ≤ 1
n
log logN ′ + o(1)
≤ inf
t∈Θ
I(Q;Wt) + o(1),
concluding the proof. 
IV. SECURE IDENTIFICATION VIA
WIRETAP CQQ-CHANNELS
An important aspect in information theory is security,
or privacy. Wyner [45] introduced the classical wiretap
channel, which he solved in the degraded case, and later
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [20] in the general case. It can be
described by two channels from the sender (“Alice”)
to the legal receiver (“Bob”) and to the eavesdropper
(“Eve”), respectively. In transmission theory the goal
is to send messages to the legal receiver, while the
wiretapper is to be kept ignorant. The wiretap channel
was generalized to the setting of quantum information
theory in [19], [21]. Formally, in contrast to the classi-
cal case, quantumly the channel has to be described by
a single quantum operation T , from Alice to the joint
system of Bob and Eve together: then we can define
the legal channel W = TrB ◦ T and the wiretapper
channel V = TrE ◦ T . Note that (unlike the classical
case) this pair of channels cannot be arbitrary! This
has to do with the no-cloning theorem: Alice’s input
state cannot be duplicated and then sent through both
channels.
However, here we will restrict ourselves to the cq-
channel case, where Alice’s input is described by a
letter x ∈ X from a finite alphabet. Then we can define
the classical-quantum wiretap channel in a simple way.
Definition 4.1: A classical-quantum wiretap chan-
nel (wiretap cqq-channel) is a pair (W,V ) of two
discrete memoryless cq-channels W : X −→ S(B)
and V : X −→ S(E). When Alice sends a classical
input xn ∈ Xn, Bob (legal receiver) and Eve (eaves-
dropper) receive the states W⊗n(xn) and V ⊗n(xn),
respectively.
Definition 4.2: An (n,M, λ, µ)-wiretap code for the
wiretap cqq-channel (W,V ) is a collection {(Pi, Di) :
i ∈ [M ]} of pairs consisting of probability distributions
Pi on Xn and a POVM (Di)Ni=1 on B⊗n such that
∀i ∈ [M ] 1− TrW⊗n(Pi)·Di ≤ λ,
∀i, j ∈ [M ] 1
2
‖V ⊗n(Pi)− V ⊗n(Pj)‖1 ≤ µ.
The largest M such that an (n,M, λ, µ)-wiretap
code exists is denotedM(n, λ, µ). The secrecy capacity
(aka private capacity) of (W,V ) is then defined as
CS(W,V ) , inf
λ,µ>0
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logM(n, λ, µ).
Note that by the Fannes inequality [22], [44], the
second condition (“privacy”) implies that for any ran-
dom variable J taking values in [M ], I(J : En) ≤
µn log |E| + h(µ). It turns out that the right hand
side can be made arbitrarily small while achieving
the capacity, because µ as well as λ can be made to
converge to 0 to any polynomial order.
Theorem 4.3 ([19]): The secrecy capacity of a wire-
tap cqq-channel is given by
CS(W,V )
= lim
n→∞ maxU→Xn→BnEn
1
n
(
I(U : Bn)− I(U : En)),
where the maximum is taken over all random variables
that satisfy the Markov chain relationships U → Xn →
BnEn. 
Thus in the case of transmission theory, we have a
positive secrecy capacity CS when the channel param-
eters of the legal channel are “better” than those of the
non-legal channel. This means we pay a price in the
form of a smaller rate for secure transmission. We will
show that in the case of identification, the situation is
different.
Definition 4.4: An (n,N, λ1, λ2, µ) wiretap ID-code
for the wiretap cqq-channel (W,V ) is a set of pairs
{(Pi, Di) : i ∈ [N ]}, where the Pi are probability
distributions on Xn, and the Di, 0 ≤ Di ≤ 1 denote
7operators on B⊗n, such that for all i 6= j ∈ [N ] and
for all 0 ≤ F ≤ 1En ,
TrW⊗n(Qi)Di ≥ 1− λ1,
TrW⊗n(Qj)Di ≤ λ2,
TrV ⊗n(Qj)F +Tr V ⊗n(Qi)(1− F ) ≥ 1− µ. (1)
If the POVMs (Di,1−Di) are all compatible, we call
the code simultaneous, as in the cq-channel case.
Condition (1) enforces that the wiretapper cannot
very well distinguish the output states QiV
⊗n of the
different messages. Indeed, it is equivalent to
µ ≥ max
0≤F≤1
Tr (V ⊗n(Qj)− V ⊗n(Qi))F
=
1
2
‖V ⊗n(Qj)− V ⊗n(Qi)‖1,
which by Helstrom’s theorem [25], [33] means that
even if Eve somehow knows that the message can only
be either i or j with equal probability, then her error
probability for discriminating these two alternatives is
at least 12 (1− µ) ≈ 12 .
The maximum N for which a (n,N, λ1, λ2, µ) wire-
tap ID-code exists is denoted by N(n, λ1, λ2, µ). For
simultaneous wiretap ID-codes we denote the maxi-
mum Nsim(n, λ1, λ2, µ). We then define the (simul-
taneous) secure identification capacity of the wiretap
channel as
CSID(W,V )
, inf
λ1,λ2,µ>0
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log logN(n, λ1, λ2, µ),
CsimSID(W,V )
, inf
λ1,λ2,µ>0
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log logNsim(n, λ1, λ2, µ),
respectively.
In this section we consider the wiretap cqq-channel
and derive a multi-letter formula for its secure identifi-
cation capacity. The idea is similar to the classical case.
We use a combination of two codes. For the converse
we generalize inequalities of [7] and [23].
Theorem 4.5 (Dichotomy theorem): Let C(W ) be the
capacity of the cq-channelW and let CS(W,V ) be the
secrecy capacity of the wiretap cqq-channel. Then,
CSID(W,V ) = C
sim
SID(W,V )
=
{
C(W ) if CS(W,V ) > 0,
0 if CS(W,V ) = 0.
Proof . For the direct part, the identification code
is constructed by means of two fundamental codes,
following [5].
Let 0 < ε < C be fixed. We know that there is
a δ > 0 such that for sufficiently large n there is an
(n,M ′, λ(n))-code C′ =
{(
u′j,D′j |j ∈ [M ′]
)}
for the
cq-channel with code size M ′ = ⌈2n(C(W)−ε)⌉ and by
Theorem 4.3 an (⌈√n ⌉,M ′′, λ(√n), µ(√n)) wiretap
code C′′ = {(u′′k,D′k|k ∈ [M ′′])} for the wiretap cqq-
channel (W ;V ) with code size M ′′ = ⌈2ε√n⌉.
In Theorem 5.6, the construction for the more gen-
eral compound model is described. We use the same
idea here to show the direct part: Alice and Bob first
create shared randomness with the help of the code C′
at a rate equal to the channel capacity. A code with
an arbitrary small positive rate is then sufficient to use
the method of Ahlswede and Dueck by sending and
decoding the function values. For this purpose we use
C′′.
Furthermore, we have to show that if CSID(W,V ) >
0, then CS(W,V ) > 0. We begin with the following
two lemmas. To state them, we fix two messages i and
j in an (n,N, λ1, λ2, µ) wiretap ID-code, and consider
the uniform distribution Q on {i, j}.
We define a new wiretap channel (W˜ , V˜ ), which
has binary input {i, j} and output states in S(Bn) and
S(En), respectively: it acts by mapping i and j to the
input distribution Pi and Pj on Xn, respectively, on
which the wiretap cqq-channel (W⊗n, V ⊗n) operates
then, yielding outputs
W˜i = W
⊗n(Pi), W˜j =W⊗n(Pj),
V˜i = V
⊗n(Pi), V˜j = V ⊗n(Pj).
Lemma 4.6: If for any POVM element 0 ≤ F ≤ 1
on E⊗n,
Tr (V ⊗n(Pj)F ) + Tr (V ⊗n(Pi)(1− F )) ≥ 1− µ,
then with Q the uniform distribution on {i, j},
I(Q; V˜ ) ≤ h
(µ
2
)
.
Proof . As remarked after Definition 4.4, the condi-
tion on F means that 12‖V˜i − V˜j‖1 ≤ µ. By the
inequalities relating trace norm and fidelity [23], this
means that F (V˜i, V˜j) ≥ 1 − µ. Invoking furthermore
Uhlmann’s theorem [39], [27], we know that there exist
purifications |ϕi〉 and |ϕj〉 ∈ B⊗n ⊗ C of V˜i and V˜j ,
respectively,
Tr Cϕx = V˜x, x ∈ {i, j},
such that
F (ϕi, ϕj) = F (V˜i, V˜j) ≥ 1− µ.
Hence, by the data processing inequality,
I(Q; V˜ ) ≤ I(Q;ϕ),
where we interpret the two states ϕi and ϕj as a
binary cq-channel. To get the desired upper bound,
we need to maximise the right hand side above over
all pairs of pure states ϕi and ϕj , with F (ϕi, ϕj) =
|〈ϕi|ϕj〉| ≥ 1−µ. This can be done explicitly because it
is effectively a two-dimensional problem in the span of
the two state vectors. Indeed, due to unitary invariance,
we may w.l.o.g. write
|ϕi〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉,
|ϕi〉 = α|0〉 − β|1〉,
8where α ≥ β ≥ 0 are real and non-negative and α2 +
β2 = 1. The fidelity constraint means that |α2−β2| ≥
1 − µ, which translates into 2β2 ≤ µ. On the other
hand, the Holevo information reduces to I(Q;ϕ) =
S
(
α2|0〉〈0|+ β2|1〉〈1|) = h(β2), which can be at most
h
(
µ
2
)
, as claimed. 
Lemma 4.7: If for some POVM element 0 ≤
D ≤ 1 (for instance the decoding POVM element
Di from the ID-code), Tr (W
⊗n(Pi)D) ≥ 1− λ1 and
Tr (W⊗n(Pj)D) ≤ λ2, with λ1, λ2 ≤ 12 , then
I(Q; W˜ ) ≥ h
(
1
2
(1 + λ1 − λ2)
)
− 1
2
h(λ1)− 1
2
h(λ2).
Proof. We construct a binary channel with inputs and
outputs {i, j}, by performing the binary measurement
(D,1−D) on the states W˜x, x ∈ {i, j}, leading to an
output y ∈ {i, j} and thus defining a channel T via
T (i|x) = Tr (W⊗n(Px)D),
T (j|x) = 1− Tr (W⊗n(Px)D).
By data processing (in fact, the original Holevo
bound!), we have
I(Q; W˜ ) ≥ I(Q;T )
≥ h
(
1
2
(1 + λ1 − λ2)
)
− 1
2
h(λ1)− 1
2
h(λ2),
the last by an elementary calculation. 
Returning to the converse proof, recall that the exis-
tence of identification codes at a positive rate implies
the following for the messages:
1) For all i ∈ [N ], Tr (W⊗n(Qi)Di) ≥ 1− λ;
2) for all i, j ∈ [N ] with i 6= j,
Tr (W⊗n(Qj)Di) ≤ λ;
3) for all i, j ∈ [N ] with i 6= j and any operator F
on B⊗n:
Tr (V ⊗n(Qj)F )+Tr (V ⊗n(Qi)(1−F )) ≥ 1−λ,
where λ1, λ2, µ ≤ λ ≤ 12 .
From the first two properties, it follows by
Lemma 4.7 that
I(Q;W ) ≥ 1− h(λ).
By the third property and Lemma 4.6,
I(Q;V ) ≤ h
(
λ
2
)
≤ h(λ).
Thus if 2h(λ) ≤ 1, which is true for all λ ≤ 115 , we
obtain I(Q; W˜ ) > I(Q; V˜ ) and so CS(W˜ , V˜ ) > 0,
which therefore must hold for the original channel
(W,V ) as well. 
Remark 4.8: In the classical case, or more gener-
ally when V˜i and V˜j commute, the upper bound of
Lemma 4.6 can be improved to
I(Q; V˜ ) ≤ µ,
cf. [23]. To see this, we use a well-known characterisa-
tion of the total variational distance (the commutative
trace distance):
1
2
‖V˜i − V˜j‖1 = min t s.t. ∃ V˜ 0i , V˜ 0j , V˜ 0⊥ states with
V˜i = tV˜
0
i + (1− t)V˜ 0⊥,
V˜j = tV˜
0
j + (1− t)V˜ 0⊥.
The optimal (1 − t)V˜ 0⊥ is simply min
(
V˜i, V˜j
)
, which
for classical discrete probability distributions is defined
pointwise, and for commuting density operators via
functional calculus. In particular, we can choose states
V˜ 0i , V˜
0
j and V˜
0
⊥, such that
V˜i = µV˜
0
i + (1− µ)V˜ 0⊥, V˜j = µV˜ 0j + (1− µ)V˜ 0⊥.
This can be interpreted as a factorisation of the channel
V˜ = V˜ 0 ◦ Eµ into an erasure channel Eµ : {i, j} −→
{i, j,⊥}, with Eµ(x|x) = µ and Eµ(⊥ |x) = 1 − µ,
and the cq-channel V˜ 0 : {i, j,⊥} −→ S(En) defined
by the states V˜ 0i , V˜
0
j and V˜
0
⊥. By data processing,
I(Q; V˜ ) ≤ I(Q; Eµ) = µ,
and we are done. 
V. SECURE IDENTIFICATION VIA
ROBUST WIRETAP CQQ-CHANNELS
In this section we consider robust and secure cq-
channels. The results for transmission capacities can
be found in [11] and [13]: In [11] the secrecy of the
classical compound channel with quantum wiretapper
and channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter
was derived. Furthermore, a lower bound on the secrecy
capacity of this channel without CSI and the secrecy
capacity of the compound classical-quantum wiretap
channel with CSI at the transmitter is determined. In
[32], a multi-letter formula for the secrecy capacity
of the compound classical-quantum wiretap channel is
given. We will show that the capacity of a compound
wiretap cqq-channel again satisfies a dichotomy theo-
rem.
Definition 5.1: Let Θ and Σ be index sets and
let W = {Wt : X → S(B) : t ∈ Θ} and
V = {Vs : X → S(E) : s ∈ Σ} be compound cq-
channels. We call the pair (W ,V) a compound wiretap
cqq-channel. The channel output of W is available to
the legitimate receiver (Bob) and the channel output
of V is available to the wiretapper (Eve). We may
sometimes write the channel as a family of pairs
(W ,V) = (Wt, Vs)t∈Θ,s∈Σ.
Definition 5.2: An (n,M, λ) transmission code for
the compound wiretap cqq-channel (Wt, Vs)t∈Θ,s∈Σ
consists of a family C = (Pi, Di)i∈[M ] where the Pi
9are probability distributions on Xn and (Di)i∈[M ] a
POVM on B⊗n such that
∀i ∈ [M ] sup
t∈Θ
1− TrW⊗n(Pi)·Di ≤ λ,
∀i, j ∈ [M ] sup
s∈Σ
1
2
‖V ⊗ns (Pi)− V ⊗ns (Pj)‖1 ≤ µ.
The capacity is defined as before.
Theorem 5.3 ([13]): The secrecy capacity of a com-
pound wiretap cqq-channel (W ,V) is given by
CS(W ,V) = lim
n→∞ supU→Xn→(Bnt Ens )
1
n
(
inf
t∈Θ
I(U ;Bnt )− sup
s∈Σ
I(U ;Ens )
)
,
where Bt are the resulting random quantum states
at the output of legal receiver channels and Es are
the resulting random quantum states at the output of
wiretap channel. 
Definition 5.4: An (n,N, λ1, λ2, µ) wiretap ID-code
for the compound wiretap cqq-channel (W ,V) is a set
of pairs {(Pi, Di) : i ∈ [N ]} where the Pi are prob-
ability distributions on Xn and the Di, 0 ≤ Di ≤ 1,
denote operators on B⊗n such that for all i 6= j ∈ [N ]
and all 0 ≤ F ≤ 1,
inf
t∈Θ
TrW⊗nt (Qi)Di ≥ 1− λ1,
sup
t∈Θ
TrW⊗nt (Qj)Di ≤ λ2,
inf
s∈Σ
TrV ⊗ns (Qj)F +TrV
⊗n
s (Qi)(1− F ) ≥ 1− µ.
(2)
We define N(n, λ1, λ2, µ) as the largest N satisfying
the above definition for a given n and set λ1, λ2, µ of
errors.
Definition 5.5: The secure identification capacity
CSID(W ,V) of a compound wiretap cqq-channel
(W ,V) is defined as CSID(W ,V) ,
inf
λ1,λ2,µ>0
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log logN(n, λ1, λ2, µ).
Again we get a dichotomy result.
Theorem 5.6: Let (W ,V) be a compound wiretap
cqq-channel. Then,
CSID(W ,V) = CsimSID(W ,V)
=
{
C(W) if CS(W ,V) > 0,
0 if CS(W ,V) = 0.
Proof . For the direct part, the identification code is
again constructed by means of two fundamental codes,
following Ahlswede and Dueck [5].
Let 0 < ε < C be fixed. We know that there is
a δ > 0 such that for sufficiently large n there is an
(n,M ′, λ(n))-code for the compound cq-channel
C′ =
{(
u′j ,D′j|j ∈ [M ′]
)}
(3)
and an (⌈√n ⌉,M ′′, λ(√n))-code for the compound
wiretap cqq-channel
C′′ = {(u′′k,D′′k |k ∈ [M ′′])} (4)
with code size M ′ = ⌈2n(C(W)−ε)⌉ and M ′′ =
⌈2ε√n⌉. Now consider a family of maps (Ti|i ∈ [N ]),
Ti : [M
′] → [M ′′], ∀ i ∈ [N ], where Ti(j) yields
the colour of code word i under colouring number j.
Thus we could construct an ID-code for the compound
wiretap cqq-channel {(Qi,Di)|i ∈ [N ]} in the follow-
ing way: Let
Qi(x
n) =
{ 1
M ′
if ∃j : xn = u′j · u′′Ti(j)
0 otherwise.
This means that we choose a colouring at random and
calculate the corresponding colour of our message. We
define the POVMs as
Di =
M ′∑
j=1
D′j ⊗D′′Ti(j).
Now we will show by random choice of the family of
maps that there exists a family which induces an ID-
code for the cq-channel with the desired error proba-
bilities. For i ∈ [N ] and j ∈ [M ′], take independent
random variables Uij with uniform distribution on the
set {u′j · u′′k|k ∈ [M ′′]}. Collecting all RVs for one
message i we get the random colour sets
U¯i = {Ui1, · · · , UiM ′} i ∈ N
and we will use equidistribution on U¯i (which is a ran-
dom probability distribution) as encoding distribution
Q¯i for message i. Therefore
D(U¯i) =
M ′∑
j=1
D(Uij)
with
D(Uij) = D′j ⊗D′′k , if Uij = u′j · u′′k.
The random ID-code for the compound cq-channel is{(
Q¯i,D(U¯i
) |i ∈ N} .
For errors of the first kind we have for all possible
realisations Ui of U¯i
min
t∈Θ
TrW⊗nt (Qi)D(Ui) ≥ 1− (λ(n) + λ(
√
n)).
Thus errors of the first kind tend to zero for n→∞.
Now we need to prove that with positive probability
we get a code with sufficiently small probability for
errors of the second kind. Then there is a realisation
with this error probability, and therefore we are done.
We will analyse the overlapping between the Ui
(which determines the probability for errors of the
second kind as we use equidistribution on the Ui as
encoding distribution for message i). To do this, we
will define a Bernoulli chain counting the intersecting
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elements between a realisation of U¯1 and U2: Let U1
be fixed and define, for j ∈ [M ′],
Ψj = Ψj
(
U¯2
)
=
{
1 if U2j ∈ U1,
0 if U2j 6∈ U1.
This means that Ψj = 1 iff messages 1 and 2 get
the same colour under colouring j. The RVs U2j are
independent, therefore the Ψj are independent with
EΨj =
1
M ′′
.
For M ′′ =
⌈
2
√
nε
⌉
, we have
D
(
λ
∥∥∥∥ 1M ′′
)
= λ log
(
λ
⌈
2
√
nε
⌉)
+ (1− λ) log 1− λ
1− ⌈2√nε⌉
= λ log
⌈
2
√
nε
⌉
+ λ logλ+ (1 − λ) log(1 − λ)
− (1− λ) log
(
1− 1⌈
2
√
nε
⌉)
≥ λ log
(
2
√
nε
)
− log
(
1− 1
2
)
= λ · √n · ε+ 1.
Now consider a realisation U2 of U¯2. We have
∀u ∈ U1\U2 : max
t∈Θ
Tr (Wnt,uD(U2)) ≤ 2−nδ+2−
√
nδ.
This follows immediately from the error bounds of our
original transmission codes (3) and (4).
If now λ ∈ (0, 1) is given, we get that with positive
probability, the events
max
t∈Θ
TrWnt,uD
(
U¯2
) ≤ λ+ 2 · 2−2√nδ (5)
and
max
t∈Θ
TrWnt,uD (U1) ≤ λ+ 2 · 2−2
√
nδ (6)
occur, provided that n is large enough. Therefore there
is a realisation U2 of U¯2 for which inequalities (5)
and (6) hold, which leads to a code of size two.
Repeating this argument for i = 3, . . . , N and upper-
bounding the probability that the newly selected Ui
does not fulfil inequalities analogous to (5) and (6)
for a certain Uj, j ∈ [N − 1] instead of U1, by the
sum of the probabilities for each Uj , we get that an(
n,N, λ+ 2 · 2−√nδ
)
-code exists, if
(N − 1)Pr

M ′∑
j=1
Ψj > M
′λ
 < 1.
But if N ≤ 22n(C−ε)(λ√nε−1), then N − 1 <
2M
′(λ
√
nε−1). Therefore 2−M
′(λ
√
nε−1) < 1
N−1 , and
hence by Hoeffding’s bound
Pr

M ′∑
j=1
Ψj > M
′λ
 < 1N − 1 .
Thus for all λ ∈ (0, 1) and for all ε > 0
lim
n→∞
1
n
log logN (n, λ)
≥ lim
n→∞
1
n
log log 22
n(C−ε)(λ
√
nε−1)
≥ lim
n→∞
n(C − ε) + log(λ√nε− 1)
n
= C − ε.
As in the classical case, it follows from the construction
of the code for the compound wiretap cqq-channel that
the wiretapper can not identify the second part of the
message, and therefore condition (2) is satisfied.
It is clear that the capacity CSID(W ,V) of the
channel with a wiretapper cannot be bigger than the
capacity CID(W) of the channel without a wiretapper.
Therefore it remains to be shown that CSID(W ,V) = 0
necessarily, if CS(W ,V) = 0. We will show the contra-
positive, that if CSID(W ,V) > 0, then CS(W ,V) > 0.
Recall Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7 from Section IV, from
which we get directly (denoting by Q the uniform
distribution on a set {i, j} of two messages):
• If for i 6= j ∈ [N ], it holds for all POVM elements
F on B⊗n and all s ∈ Σ that
Tr (V ⊗ns (Pj)F )+Tr (V
⊗n
s (Pi)(1−F )) ≥ 1−λ,
then
sup
s∈Σ
I(Q;V ⊗ns ) ≤ h
(
λ
2
)
.
• If for i 6= j ∈ [N ], it holds for all t ∈ Θ that
Tr (W⊗nt (Pi)Di) ≥ 1− λ, and
Tr (W⊗nt (Pj)Di) ≤ λ,
then
min
t∈Θ
I(Q;W⊗nt ) ≥ 1− h(λ).
The existence of an ID-wiretap code with positive
rate implies the above conditions. Hence, as before,
we obtain if λ ≤ 115 , then
CS(W ,V) ≥ 1
n
(
inf
t∈Θ
I(Q;W⊗nt )− sup
s∈Σ
I(Q;V ⊗ns )
)
> 0,
and we are done. 
VI. IDENTIFICATION IN THE
PRESENCE OF A JAMMER
In this section we perform the same analysis for the
case of arbitrarily varying cq-channels, with analogous
findings. We point out, however, that we only consider
finite index sets Θ throughout this and the following
section.
Definition 6.1: Let Θ be a finite index set, X a finite
set and B a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. Let Wt :
X −→ S(B) be a cq-channel for every t ∈ Θ:
Wt : X ∋ x 7→Wt(x) ∈ S(B), t ∈ Θ.
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Let tn ∈ Θn be a state sequence. The memory-
less extension of the cq-channel Wtn is given by
Wtn(x
n) =Wt1(x1)⊗. . .⊗Wtn(xn) for xn ∈ Xn. We
call W , {Wt}t∈Θ an arbitrarily varying cq-channel.
In this case a jammer can change the channel during
the transmission.
Definition 6.2: An (n,M, λ)-code for the arbi-
trarily varying cq-channel W is a family C ,
((Pm, Dm) : m ∈ [M ]) consisting of pairs of stochas-
tic encodings given by code word probability distribu-
tions Pm over Xn and positive semi-definite operators
Di on B⊗n, forming a POVM, i.e.
∑M
m=1Dm = 1,
such that
max
tn∈Θn
max
i∈[M ]
1− TrW⊗ntn (Pi)Di ≤ λ.
Like in the compound case, here we allow explicitly
stochastic encoders. The number M is called the size
of the code, and λ the error probability. The maximum
M for given n and λ is denoted M(n, λ), extending
the definition for a cq-channel (which is recovered for
|Θ| = 1).
The capacity of W is defined as before,
C(W) = inf
λ>0
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logM(n, λ).
A more intuitive description of the arbitrarily varying
cq-channel is that a jammer tries to prevent the legal
parties from communicating properly. He may change
his input in every channel use and is not restricted to
use a repetitive probabilistic strategy. Quite on the con-
trary, it is understood that the sender and the receiver
have to select their coding scheme first. After that the
jammer makes his choice of the sequence of channel
states. The sender and receiver do not know which
channel from the set W is actually used; their prior
knowledge is merely that the channel is memoryless
and belongs to the set W . Their task is to prepare for
the worst case among those.
Definition 6.3:We say that the arbitrarily varying cq-
channel W = {Wt : t ∈ Θ} is symmetrizable if there
exists a parametrized set of distributions {τ(·|x) : x ∈
X}, on Θ also known as a channel τ from X to Θ,
such that for all x, x′ ∈ X ,∑
t∈Θ
τ(t|x)Wt(x′) =
∑
t∈Θ
τ(t|x′)Wt(x).
To formulate the capacity theorem of [2], we need
the following notations. For an arbitrarily varying cq-
channel W we denote its convex hull by conv(W). It
is defined as follows:
conv(W) =
{
Wq : Wq =
∑
t∈Θ
q(t)Wt, q ∈ P(Θ),
}
.
Furthermore, we set
Cran(W) , max
p∈P(X )
min
W∈conv(W)
I(p;W ).
This is called the random coding capacity of the chan-
nel. Under this notion, the encoding with a stochastic
encoder is generalized to a (correlated) random code. It
is assumed that the sender and the receiver have access
to some source with correlated randomness, which,
however, is secret from the jammer. Here we need just
the quantity to give the transmission capacity of the
arbitrarily varying cq-channel.
Theorem 6.4 ([2]): Let W be an arbitrarily varying
cq-channel. Then its capacity C(W) is given by
C(W) =
{
0 if W is symmetrizable,
Cran(W) otherwise. 
Definition 6.5: An (n,N, λ1, λ2) ID-code for the
arbitrarily varying cq-channel W is a set of pairs
{(Pi, Di) : i ∈ [N ]}, where the Pi are probability
distributions on Xn and the Di are POVM elements,
i.e. 0 ≤ Di ≤ 1, acting on B⊗n, such that ∀ i 6= j ∈
[N ]
min
tn∈Θn
TrWtn(Pi)·Di ≥ 1− λ1 and
max
tn∈Θn
TrWtn(Pi)·Dj ≤ λ2.
The largest size of an (n,N, λ1, λ2) ID-code is denoted
N(n, λ1, λ2). Analogous to previous definitions, we
have also simultaneous ID-codes and the maximum
code size Nsim(n, λ1, λ2).
The identification capacities are now defined as
before.
With the help of the method from Theorem 3.5 we
can show that the transmission capacity of the channel
corresponds to the identification capacity. To do this, in
the proof of the direct part we simply use a code for an
arbitrary varying cq-channel instead of the code for the
compound cq-channel. To show the converse, we show
that the error of the first type in the identification can
not be arbitrarily small if the channel is symmetrizable.
Therefore, we get the following.
Theorem 6.6: Let W be an arbitrarily varying cq-
channel. Then its ID-capacity is given by
CsimID (W) = CID(W)
=
{
0 if W is symmetrizable,
Cran(W) otherwise. 
VII. SECURE IDENTIFICATION
IN THE PRESENCE OF A JAMMER
In this section we add a wiretapper to the arbitrarily
varying cq-channel. First we define the transmission
codes and quote the known transmission capacity. Us-
ing this result, we then calculate the secure identifi-
cation capacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-
channel.
Definition 7.1: Let Θ and Σ be finite index sets,
and let W = {Wt : X → S(B) : t ∈ Θ} and
V = {Vs : X → S(E) : s ∈ Σ} be arbitrarily varying
cq-channels. We call the pair (W ,V) an arbitrarily
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varying wiretap cqq-channel. The channel output of
W is available to the legitimate receiver (Bob) and the
channel output of V is available to the wiretapper (Eve).
We may sometimes write the channel as a family of
pairs (W ,V) = (Wt, Vs)t∈Θ,s∈Σ.
Definition 7.2: An (n,M, λ) transmission
code for the arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-
channel (Wt, Vs)t∈Θ,s∈Σ consists of a family
C = (Pi, Di)i∈[M ], where the Pi are probability
distributions on Xn and (Di)i∈[M ] a POVM on B⊗n
such that
∀i ∈ [M ] max
tn∈Θn
1− TrW⊗ntn (Pi)·Di ≤ λ,
∀i, j ∈ [M ] max
sn∈Σn
1
2
‖V ⊗nsn (Pi)− V ⊗nsn (Pj)‖1 ≤ µ.
The capacity is defined as before. To state the result
of [15] we again introduce the random coding capacity,
CS,ran(W ,V) , lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→Xn→Bn
tn
En
sn(
min
Ŵ∈conv{Wt:t∈Θ}
I(pU ; Ŵ
⊗n)
− max
sn∈Σn
I(pU ;Vsn)
)
.
Here, Bntn are the resulting quantum states at the
output of the legitimate receiver’s channels. Ensn are the
resulting quantum states at the output of the wiretap
channels. The maximum is taken over all random
variables that satisfy the Markov chain relationships:
U → Xn → BntnEnsn . Xn is here a random variable
taking values in Xn, U a random variable taking values
on some finite set U with probability distribution pU .
In [15] the following dichotomy is shown.
Theorem 7.3 ([15]): Let CS(W ,V) denote the ca-
pacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channel
(W ,V). Then,
CS(W ,V) =
{
0 if W is symmetrizable,
CS,ran(W ,V) otherwise. 
As in the previous section, we can now use a similar
proof technique to determine the secure identification
capacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channel.
We start by defining the identification codes.
Definition 7.4: An (n,N, λ1, λ2, µ) wiretap ID-code
for the arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channel (W ,V)
is a set of pairs {(Pi, Di) : i ∈ [N ]} where the Pi are
probability distributions on Xn and the Di, 0 ≤ Di ≤
1, denote operators on B⊗n such that ∀i, j ∈ [N ], i 6=
j and 0 ≤ F ≤ 1,
min
tn∈Θn
TrW⊗ntn (Qi)Di ≥ 1− λ1,
max
tn∈Θn
TrW⊗ntn (Qj)Di ≤ λ2,
min
sn∈Σn
TrV ⊗nsn (Qj)F +TrV
⊗n
sn (Qi)(1− F ) ≥ 1− µ.
We define N(n, λ1, λ2, µ) as the largest N satisfying
the above definition for a given n and set λ1, λ2, µ of
errors.
Definition 7.5: The identification capacity
CSID(W ,V) of an arbitrarily varying wiretap
cqq-channel (W ,V) is defined as
CSID(W ,V)
, inf
λ1,λ2,µ>0
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log logN(n, λ1, λ2, µ).
Again we show a dichotomy result, using the idea of
Theorem 5.6. As fundamental codes we use for C′ a
code for the arbitrarily varying cq-channel and for C′′
a code for the arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channel,
both reaching the capacity. If the transmission capacity
for C′′ is positive, we get as an identification capacity
the transmission capacity of C′′. The security follows
by the strong secrecy condition like in Theorem 5.6.
Also the converse follows the same idea. Therefore we
get the following.
Theorem 7.6 (Dichotomy): Let C(W) be the capac-
ity of the arbitrarily varying cq-channel W and let
CS(W ,V) be the secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily
varying wiretap cq-channel (W ,V). Then,
CSID(W ,V) = CsimSID(W ,V)
=
{
C(W) if CS(W ,V) > 0,
0 if CS(W ,V) = 0. 
In this theorem the capacity is a single letter formula,
but the condition if the capacity is positive is given by
the multi-letter formula for the random coding secret
capacity.
Remark 7.7: In the case of transmission it is possible
to avoid the capacity being zero if the channel is sym-
metrizable, if we allow the sender and receiver to use
common randomness. With this resource the capacity
will not change if the channel is non-symmetrizable,
but if the channel is symmetrizable then the capacity
may go up from zero to the random coding capacity.
The situation appears different in the case of iden-
tification. We can, of course, use the same resource to
get rid of the vanishing capacity in the symmetrizable
case. However, note that a positive rate of common
randomness, by the concatenated code construction of
Ahlswede and Dueck [5], increases the ID-capacity by
the same amount. Fortunately, it comes to our rescue
the fact that whenever common randomness is required
to achieve the random coding capacity for transmission,
then a rate of asymptotically zero is sufficient [1].
Thus, we could define random coding capacities with
zero rate of common randomness without changing
the notion for transmission, while obtaining a sound
capacity concept for the identification problem.
VIII. CONTINUITY AND SUPER-ADDITIVITY
In [16] we discussed the continuity and super-
additivity for the identification capacity of a classical
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compound channel and a classical compound wiretap
channel. It turns out that the results for the capacity of
the classical-quantum case are completely analogous.
Therefore we just list the results here and discuss them
as briefly as possible.
A. Distance between cq-channels
First we need a metric to measure the distance
between two cq-channels.
Definition 8.1: Let W, W˜ : X −→ S(B) be two cq-
channels. The distance between them is defined as
d(W, W˜ ) , max
x∈X
∥∥∥W (x)− W˜ (x)∥∥∥
1
,
where ‖·‖1 denotes the trace norm.
Next, we extend this concept to the compound and
arbitrarily varying case.
Definition 8.2: Let W = (Wt)t∈Θ and W˜ =
(W˜s)s∈Θ˜ be two compound or arbitrarily varying cq-
channels with input alphabet X and let
G(W , W˜) , sup
t∈Θ
inf
t′∈Θ˜
d(Wt, W˜t′).
Then we define the distance between the two cq-
channels as
D(W , W˜) , max{G(W , W˜), G(W˜ ,W)}.
Obviously, it is desirable to have a continuous be-
haviour of the capacity, meaning that small varia-
tions in the channel (i.e. the set W) set should only
lead to small variations in the corresponding capacity.
Let W(X ,S(B)) be the family of all compound cq-
channels W = (Wt)t∈Θ with Wt : X −→ S(B), with
respect to the above metric D. We use the distance
definition to define continuity for points and functions
in the usual way.
Similarly, for wiretap cqq-channels (W ,V), the met-
ric to measure the distance between two wiretap cqq-
channels is as follows.
Definition 8.3: Let (W,V ) and (W˜ , V˜ ) be two
wiretap cqq-channels with the same input alphabet X ,
then we define
dS((W,V ), (W˜ , V˜ )) , max{d(W, W˜ ), d(V, V˜ )}.
If (W ,V) and (W˜ , V˜) are two compound/arbitrarily
varying wiretap cqq-channels with the same input al-
phabet X . Then we define
DS
(
(W ,V), (W˜ , V˜)) , max{D(W , W˜), D(V , V˜)}.
The notions of the (dis-)continuity points are as usual.
We also consider parallel (i.e. tensor product) chan-
nels, which means that they map pair of inputs inde-
pendently to a tensor product of the output systems:
define W ⊗ W˜ as the set of channels
Wt1 ⊗ W˜t2 : X1 ×X2 → S(B1)⊗ S(B2),
with
Wt1 ⊗ W˜t2(x1, x2) ,Wt1(x1)⊗ W˜t2(x2).
Let W be a compound cq-channel. From Theo-
rem 3.5, we know that
CID(W) = C(W) = max
P
min
t∈Θ
I(P ;Wt).
This is a continuous function of W and therefore the
following holds.
Corollary 8.4: CID is a continuous function on
W(X ,S(B)). 
Regarding the additivity, we can once more use
Theorem 3.5. It follows immediately that
Corollary 8.5: For any two compound cq-channels
W and W˜ ,
CID(W⊗W˜) = CID(W)+CID(W˜). 
Definition 8.6: We say that a capacity C is super-
additive if we can find two channels (W,V ) and
(W˜ , V˜ ) such that
C(W ⊗ W˜ , V ⊗ V˜ ) > C(W,V ) + C(W˜ , V˜ ). (7)
The following theorem characterizes the discontinu-
ity points of CSID completely. It also shows that the
set of discontinuity points is never empty.
Theorem 8.7: The wiretap cqq-channel (W,V ) is a
discontinuity point of CSID iff
1) C(W ) > 0,
2) CS(W,V ) = 0, and
3) For each ε > 0 there exists a wiretap channel
(Wε, Vε) such that dS((W,V ), (Wε, Vε)) < ε
and CS(Wε, Vε) > 0.
The proof follows the same idea as the proof for the
classical case in [16, Thm. 6.1]. For each cq-channel
W with C(W ) > 0, there exists a channel V∗, such
that for (W,V∗) the conditions 2 and 3 of Theorem 8.7
are fulfilled. Therefore (W,V∗) is an example of a
discontinuity point of CSID. Because of that, there is
a huge number of discontinuity points.
Corollary 8.8: Let (W,V ) be a wiretap cqq-channel
with CSID(W,V ) > 0. Then there exists a εˆ > 0, such
that for all (W˜ , V˜ ) with D((W,V ), (W˜ , V˜ )) < εˆ, it
holds that CSID(W˜ , V˜ ) > 0. 
The identification capacity of a compound cq-
channel is additive and therefore not super-additive.
It follows by its operational definition that for the
message transmission capacity and for the message
transmission secrecy capacity, inequality (7) holds with
“≥”.
By the same argument, we can show that the same
also holds for the secure identification capacity.
Proposition 8.9: For any two wiretap cqq-channels
(W,V ) and (W˜ , V˜ ),
CSID(W⊗W˜ , V ⊗V˜ ) ≥ CSID(W,V )+CSID(W˜ , V˜ ).
Proof. This follows from the coding theorem. 
The following theorem gives a complete characteri-
zation of the super-additivity behaviour of CSID.
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Theorem 8.10: Let (W,V ) and (W˜ , V˜ ) be two
wiretap cqq-channels.
1) Assume min{C(W ), C(W˜ )} > 0. Then,
CSID(W⊗W˜ , V ⊗V˜ ) > CSID(W,V )+CSID(W˜ , V˜ )
holds iff CS(W ⊗ W˜ , V ⊗ V˜ ) > 0, but at least one of
CS(W,V ) or CS(W˜ , V˜ ) equals 0.
2) Assume C(W ) = 0 [C(W˜ ) = 0]. Then,
CSID(W⊗W˜ , V ⊗V˜ ) > CSID(W,V )+CSID(W˜ , V˜ )
holds iff CS(W ⊗ W˜ , V ⊗ V˜ ) > 0, but CS(W˜ , V˜ ) = 0
[CS(W,V ) = 0].
The proof follows the same idea as the proof for the
classical case [16, Thm. 6.2]. 
Theorem 8.11: Let (W ,V) be a compound wiretap
cqq-channel. (W ,V) is a discontinuity point of CSID
if the following properties are fulfilled:
1) C(W) > 0
2) CS(W ,V) = 0
3) For all ε > 0 there exists a CWC (Wε,Vε) with
DS((W ,V), (Wε,Vε)) < ε and CS(Wε,Vε) >
0.
The proof follows the same idea as the proof for the
classical case [16, Thm. 6.3]. 
As before, we find a large number of discontinu-
ity points. Now we characterize the super-additivity
of these channels. Theorem 8.10 can be generalized
for compound wiretap cqq-channels. Furthermore, we
consider the sharpest form of super-additivity, that is,
super-activation.
Definition 8.12: We say that a capacity C can be
super-activated if we can find two cqq-channels (W ,V)
and (W˜ , V˜) such that
C(W⊗W˜ ,V⊗V˜) > 0 and C(W ,V) = C(W˜ , V˜) = 0.
Theorem 8.13: Let (W ,V) and (W˜ , V˜) be two
compound wiretap cqq-channels. Then for these two
channels we have super-activation for CSID iff we have
super-activation for CS .
The proof follows the same idea as the proof for the
classical [16, Thm. 6.4]. 
The analysis of the transmission capacities of the
arbitarily varying cq-channels and arbitrarily varying
wiretap cqq-channels has been done in [12] and [13].
There we showed that the transmission random coding
capacity of the arbitrarily varying cq-channel is contin-
uous.
To give a complete characterization of the disconti-
nuity points of the capacity as in [17], let us introduce
the set
N = {W finite and symmetrizable}.
Note that being symmetrizable is a closed condition,
hence N is a closed set under the convergence induced
by the metric D. With this, we can give a complete
characterization of the discontinuity points of the ca-
pacity, just as in [17].
Theorem 8.14: The capacity CID(W) is discontinu-
ous at the finite cq-AVCW iff the following conditions
hold:
1) Cran(W) > 0
2) W ∈ N , i.e. the channel is symmetrizable, and
for every ε > 0 there exists a finite arbitrarily
varying cq-channel W˜ with D(W, W˜ ) < ε and
W˜ 6∈ N . 
The second condition is precisely that W belongs to
the boundary of N , ∂N = {W ∈ N : ∀ε >
0 ∃W˜ s.t. D(W˜ ,W) < ε and W˜ 6∈ N}. The fol-
lowing result establishes a certain robustness property
of the capacity. It holds because N is a closed set,
hence every point outside it has a neighbourhood not
intersecting it.
Theorem 8.15: Let W be a finite arbitrarily varying
cq-channel with W being not symmetrizable. Then
there exists an ε > 0 such that all finite arbitrarily
varying cq-channels W˜ with D(W˜ ,W) < ε are conti-
nuity points of CID(W). 
Let W be an arbitrary varying cq-channel and
{Wn}∞n=1 be an arbitrary sequence of finite arbitrarily
varying cq-channels with
lim
n→∞D(Wn,W) = 0. (8)
We define the variance of CID(Wn) for the sequence
{Wn} = {Wn}∞n=1 as
V ({Wn}) = lim sup
n→∞
CID(Wn)− lim inf
n→∞ CID(Wn),
and furthermore, let
V (W) = supV ({Wn}),
where the sup is taken over all {Wn} and W that sat-
isfy (8). In other words, V (W) describes the maximal
variation of CID(W) in the neighborhood of a certain
channel W . Finally,
V = sup
W
V¯ (W)
is the maximal variation for all arbitrarily varying
cq-channel W . Furthermore, we set N∞ , {W :
Cran(W) = 0}. Then we have the following result.
Theorem 8.16: For a finite arbitrarily varying cq-
channel W , the following assertions hold:
1) V (W) = 0 for W 6∈ ∂N\N∞.
2) V (W) = Cran(W) for W ∈ ∂N \ N∞.
3) V = sup
W∈∂N\N∞
Cran(W). 
Now we will examine the additivity of the capacity
function.
Theorem 8.17: Let W1 and W2 be two arbitrarily
varying cq-channels. Then, CID(W1 ⊗ W2) = 0 iff
CID(W1) = CID(W2) = 0. 
The next result shows that the ID capacity is super-
additive.
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Theorem 8.18: Let W1 and W2 be two arbitrarily
varying cq-channels. Then,
CID(W1 ⊗W2) > CID(W1) + CID(W2)
iff exactly one of the two channels W1, W2 is sym-
metrizable while the other one is not, and both ran-
dom coding capacities are positive, Cran(W1) > 0,
Cran(W2) > 0. 
Now we will analyze the continuity of CSID for ar-
bitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels. In Theorem 7.6
we showed that CSID(W ,V) = CsimSID(W ,V) =
C(W) if CS(W ,V) > 0 and = 0 otherwise. We shall
now use this result to fully characterize the continuity
behavior and the discontinuity behaviour of CSID. To
do so, we distinguish two cases, 1. CS,ran(W ,V) > 0
and 2. CS,ran(W ,V) = 0.
Theorem 8.19: Let (W ,V) be a a finite arbitrarily
varying wiretap cqq-channel with CS,ran(W ,V) > 0.
Then, (W ,V) is a discontinuity point of CSID iff W
is symmetrizable in the boundary of N , i.e. W ∈ ∂N .
The proof follows the same lines as the argument in
[17]. 
Furthermore, we have the following important sta-
bility results.
Theorem 8.20: Let (Ŵ , V̂) be a cq-AVWC with
CSID(Ŵ , V̂) > 0. Then there exists an ε >
0 such that for all finite cq-AVWCs (W ,V) with
D((W ,V), (Ŵ , V̂)) < ε, always CSID(W ,V) > 0.
In particular, CSID is continuous at (Ŵ , V̂). 
Theorem 8.21: Let (W ,V) be a a finite arbitrar-
ily varying wiretap cqq-channel with CS,ran(W ,V) =
0. Then, (W ,V) is a point of discontinuity of
CSID iff Cran(W) > 0 and for every ε >
0 there exists a finite cq-AVWC (Wε,Vε) with
D((W ,V), (Wε,Vε)) < ε, such that Wε is not sym-
metrizable and CS,ran(Wε,Vε) > 0. 
To end, we fully characterize the occurrence of
super-activation and super-additivity for CSID . Of
course, super-activation is the most powerful form of
super-additivity, in this case two channels each with
capacity zero combine to one with positive capacity.
It is known that CID cannot be super-activated. For
CSID, a different behaviour can be observed:
Theorem 8.22: Let (W1,V1), (W2,V2) be two arbi-
trarily varying wiretap cqq-channels. Then the follow-
ing holds.
1) If max{CS,ran(W1,V1), CS,ran(W2,V2)} > 0,
then CSID shows super-activation for these two
channels precisely when one of CS,ran(W1,V1)
or CS,ran(W2,V2) equals 0, and the other one
is positive. W.l.o.g. CS,ran(W2,V2) = 0 and
CS,ran(W1,V1) > 0. Therefore, W1 necessarily
is symmetrizable.
2) If CS,ran(W1,V1) = CS,ran(W2,V2) = 0, then
CSID can be super-activated for these channels
iff W1 ⊗ W2 is not symmetrizable. (Note that
this condition is equivalent to saying that at
least one of the two channels W1 or W2 is not
symmetrizable.) 
Next, we characterise the case in which we observe
super-additivity, but in which no super-activation oc-
curs.
Theorem 8.23: Let (W1,V1) and (W2,V2) be two
arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels for which no
super-activation occurs. Then, for these two channels,
super-additivity of CSID applies iff CSID(W1,V1) >
0 and CS(W2,V2) = 0 but Cran(W2) > 0, or analo-
gously with 1 and 2 interchanged.
In [12], super-activation has been shown for the
transmission capacity of the classical arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channels, and in [14], a full
characterization have been given.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have extended the theory of identi-
fication via quantum channels to include realistic con-
siderations of robustness and security. The former we
modelled by channel uncertainty in both compound and
arbitrarily varying cq-channels, the latter by consider-
ing wiretap channels. We considered these additions of
robustness and secrecy constraints separately, and even-
tually both of them together. These notions generalize
the ones presented in [16] for classical channels, and
we found capacity characterizations quite analogous to
those of [16]. There we have also given applications for
using ID-codes in the secure and robust setting; these
applications evidently extend to cq-channels.
The first, visible difference in the results resides in
the fact that while the classical theory in all variants
essentially yields single-letter formulas, the analogues
for quantum channels are to a large part multi-letter
formulas that elude efficient computation, as already
seen in the case of cq-channels considered here, let
alone for general quantum channels.
Secondly, as has been stressed from the beginning
of the theory of identification via quantum channels,
it comes naturally in two flavours, simultaneous [30]
and non-simultaneous [6] identification. This is be-
cause in quantum mechanics the different tests for
the various messages correspond to measurements that
are not necessarily compatible, which is an entirely
non-classical phenomenon. Since it has an additional
constraint on the decoder, the simultaneous ID-capacity
is always upper bounded by the non-simultaneous ID-
capacity; thus, it is desirable to prove the direct coding
theorems for the former, and the converses for the
latter. We do this here, and find that simultaneous
and non-simultaneous ID-capacities coincide in all the
models considered, generalizing the result of [6] for
ideally known and secrecy-free cq-channels. It should
be noted, however, that for general quantum channels,
a gap between simultaneous and non-simultaneous ID-
capacities is expected, cf. [43].
The converses for the non-simultaneous ID-
capacities are considerably more difficult than their
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classical and simultaneous analogues. As a matter of
fact, those can be obtained by general information spec-
trum and resolvability methods, while the converses
and dichotomy theorems of the non-simultaneous cq-
versions require genuine quantum generalizations of
resolvability ideas, as is already evident in the matrix
concentration bounds from [6]. In the present paper,
an interesting case is that of the compound channel
(Theorem 3.5), where the converse proof is specifically
adapted to the channel model, and it follows a com-
pletely different idea from the one known for classical
channels. Another manifestation of the different char-
acter of classical and quantum information is the form
of the maximum mutual information of a cq-channel
with two output states µ-close in trace norm (Lemma
4.6). We need this technical bound to argue that ID-
secrecy implies wiretap communication secrecy. While
in Remark 4.8 it is shown that for classical channels
this maximum information is precisely µ (cf. also [7]),
the analysis for cq-channels is not only much more
involved, it also only yields a very different-looking
upper bound. We wish to highlight it as an interesting
open problem to determine precisely what the optimal
upper bound in Lemma 4.6 is.
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